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Summary
Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has often
been accused of manipulating the flow of information and prohibiting the
dissemination of viewpoints that criticize the government or stray from the official
Communist party view.  The introduction of Internet technology in the mid-1990’s
presented a challenge to government control over news sources, and by extension,
over public opinion.  While the Internet has developed rapidly and increased the daily
convenience of many Chinese citizens, freedom of expression online, as in the media,
is still significantly stifled.  
Empirical studies have found that China has one of the most sophisticated
content-filtering Internet regimes in the world.  The Chinese government employs
increasingly sophisticated methods to limit content online, including a combination
of legal regulation, surveillance, and punishment to promote self-censorship, as well
as technical controls.  U.S. government efforts to defeat Internet “jamming,” include
funding through the Broadcasting Board of Governors to provide counter-censorship
software to Chinese Internet users to access Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Voice of
America (VOA) sites available to Chinese users.  There is considerable debate,
however, on whether developing and implementing counter-censorship software is
the most effective U.S. strategy to combat information control on the Internet in
China.  
Since China’s market-oriented reforms in 1979, the United States and China
have had increasingly strong economic ties.  Many U.S. observers, including
government officials, believe that Internet growth and economic openness will bring
about greater freedom of expression and political openness in China. However,
contrary to facilitating freedom, some private U.S. companies have been charged
with aiding or complying with Chinese Internet censorship.  Private U.S. companies
that provide Internet hardware, such as routers, as well as those that provide Internet
services such as web-log (blog) hosting or search portals, have been accused of
ignoring international standards for freedom of expression when pursuing business
opportunities in the PRC market. 
In the 108th Congress, the provisions of the “Global Internet Freedom Act” (H.R.
48) were subsumed into the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2004-05 (H.R.
1950) and passed by the House on July 16, 2003.  Christopher Cox reintroduced the
bill (H.R. 2219) to the 109th Congress in May 2005.  If passed, the act would
authorize $50,000,000 for FY2006 and FY2007 to develop and implement a global
Internet freedom policy.  The act would also establish an office within the
International Broadcasting Bureau with the sole mission of countering Internet
jamming by repressive governments. 
This report will not be updated.
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Internet Development and Information
Control in China (PRC)
The government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) places strict
limitations on its domestic and foreign news media.  Information that is considered
“politically sensitive” or that conveys organized dissent and criticism of the
Communist Party is not tolerated.1  As a result, information or objective reporting on
subjects such as China’s human rights record, Tibetan independence, Falun Gong,
Taiwan, or the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, among other topics, are largely absent
in China.  Journalists have allegedly been harassed, sometimes with violence, and
jailed for reporting content that is undesirable or that implicate government officials
in corruption.  In addition to reporting that is critical of the government, PRC
leadership actively suppresses coverage of events that it considers a threat to social
stability.  State coverups of the early spread of AIDS, the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in April 2003, and fatal industrial disasters are notable
examples of issues that have been censored in the Chinese media.2 
Internet Development and Use in China
 In the early stages of its development, the Internet presented a challenge to
Chinese government control over information flows and public opinion.  In pursuit
of economic growth and modernization, however, the government actively promoted
Internet development.  Because it is subject to PRC censorship, yet continues to
spread news across national borders, the Internet has played a role in bringing
international attention to issues forbidden in China, including PRC censorship itself.
Since the country’s first connection in 1993, the Internet has experienced
exponential growth in China.3  According to a government sponsored report, the
number of Chinese Internet users (not including Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan)
reached 103 million by July 2005.  The official report also finds that over half of the
users have broadband access (51%), are educated (55% had completed at least
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college), male (60%), or young (71% were under age 30).4   Another study estimates
that there are currently up to 134 million Chinese Internet users, approximately a
fivefold increase from 23 million in 2001.5  Although 103 million or 134 million
would account for only 8% or 10% of China’s population, respectively, Internet
usage is expected to rise as China continues to promote Internet development and
enjoy rapid economic growth.
As in the United States, the Internet has already transformed the daily lives of
many people in China.  Chinese citizens are able to use the Internet to communicate
with others, find entertainment, engage in commercial activities, and obtain
permissible information.6  Chinese studies have found that the majority of Internet
users in China use the Internet for entertainment purposes.7  Notwithstanding, the
PRC government strictly controls news and political content online, which has drawn
the attention and criticism of many analysts and U.S. policymakers. 
Censorship and Content Control of the Internet
During the early days of the Internet in China, some observers hoped that greater
access to information brought about by this new technology would also encourage
political expression and democracy in China.  Although there has been a documented
expansion in the scope of permissible private speech in recent years, the Chinese
government has also intensified efforts to monitor and control use of the Internet and
wireless technologies (e.g. cellular phones).8  
An often cited empirical study by the OpenNet Initiative (a collaboration
between Harvard Law School, University of Toronto Citizen Lab, and Cambridge
Security Program) found that China has the most sophisticated content-filtering
Internet regime in the world.9  Compared to similar efforts in other countries, the
Chinese government effectively filters content by employing multiple methods of
regulation and technical controls.  The PRC-sponsored news agency, Xinhua, stated
that censorship targets “superstitious, pornographic, violence-related, gambling and
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other harmful information.”10  However, many observers are concerned about the
pervasive filtering of any content that the Communist Party of China views as
politically objectionable.   Informational websites, including that of the BBC, Voice
of America, and the public encyclopedia, Wikipedia, have been blocked in China.11
In addition to censorship of news reports that may present the government in a
negative light, the Internet is used to channel and influence public opinion, especially
in support of nationalistic sentiments.  The People’s Daily, a state-sponsored
newspaper, has an online bulletin board called the “Strong Nation Forum,” intended
for discussion on how to make China a stronger nation.  The forum hosted angry anti-
Japanese postings in April 2005, during a political fallout between China and Japan
concerning Japan’s alleged re-writing of wartime atrocities in its history textbooks.12
Earlier that year, however, when users visited the forum to mourn the death of
former Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang, moderators promptly
removed messages of condolence. Zhao, stripped of his government position for
sympathizing with Tiananmen student protesters in 1989, had been held under strict
house arrest until his death, which received only muted attention in the national
media. Some observers interpret this as reflecting government sensitivity to calls for
the rehabilitation of those condemned during the protests.13
Methods of PRC Internet Censorship and Content
Control
In order to suppress politically sensitive or undesirable content online, the PRC
has adopted two main strategies.  First, the Chinese government employs a complex
system of regulations, surveillance, and punitive action to promote self-censorship
among the public.  Second, the government uses technology and human monitors to
physically filter unwanted content.  
Legal Regulations
Since the commercialization of the Internet in 1995, the PRC government has
issued extensive regulations regarding Internet usage.  Because these regulations
often overlap, are regularly updated, and are created and carried out by multiple
government agencies, the legal infrastructure regarding Internet usage in China is
extraordinarily complex.  At least 12 different government agencies are involved in
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Internet regulation, which are directed at Internet service and content providers,
cyber-café operators, and Internet users themselves.14 
 
Internet service providers (ISPs) must obtain an operating license from the
Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and record each customer’s account number,
phone number, IP address, sites visited, and time spent online.  Internet content
providers (ICPs) that publish information, operate electronic bulletin boards, or
engage in journalism must record all content made available and the date it was
issued.  For both service and content providers, these records must be maintained for
60 days and surrendered to relevant government agencies upon request.15 After
obtaining permission to open an Internet café, café operators are required to install
software that blocks pornographic and “subversive” content, keep detailed logs
linking users to the pages they visited and record visits to any blocked pages, and
report these to the Public Security Bureau.16  As with ISPs and ICPs, cafes must
retain this information for 60 days.  PRC authorities reportedly closed 47,000
unlicensed Internet cafes in 2004 while installing monitoring software in others.17 
In addition to regulations directed at Internet service and content providers, this
complex  legal  infrastructure is also extended to Internet users themselves.  The
Ministry of Public Security took initial steps to control Internet use in 1997 when it
issued comprehensive regulations governing internet use.  Selected portions of three
key sections, Articles 4-6, are presented here:  
Individuals are prohibited from using the Internet to:  harm national security;
disclose state secrets; or injure the interests of the state or society [4].  Users are
prohibited from using the Internet to create, replicate, retrieve, or transmit
information that incites resistance to the PRC Constitution, laws, or
administrative regulations; promotes the overthrow of the government or socialist
system; undermines national unification; distorts the truth, spreads rumors, or
destroys social order; or provides sexually suggestive material or encourages
gambling, violence, or murder [ 5]. Users are prohibited from engaging in
activities that harm the security of computer information networks and from
using networks or changing network resources without prior approval [6].18
September 25, 2005 Regulations.  On July 1, 2005, Chinese authorities
shut down thousands of websites that had not registered with the government.
Following this stringent measure, in September 2005, the PRC State Council and the
MII announced new rules regarding the administration of the Internet.  These new
rules formalized interim provisions enacted in 2000, which established general
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Internet content regulations and a mandatory system of licensing and registration for
those engaged in “Internet information services.”19  
In addition to combining and clarifying earlier provisions, the new rules both
tighten control over online news services and define them more broadly.  They
stipulate that private individuals or groups must register as “news organizations”
before they can operate websites or e-mail distribution lists that spread news or
commentary.  Because a news organization is required to employ experienced staff,
have registered premises, capital, and a transparent system of operation whereby
writings can be attributed, approval will likely be difficult for many individuals and
private groups.20  Websites and popular Internet portals such as Sina.com or
Sohu.com must publish only news items, without commentary, even though
commentary is often a staple of Web-logs, or “blogs.”21  According to the PRC news
agency, Xinhua, electronic bulletin board systems (BBS) and cell-phone text
messages that contain news content are also subject to these regulations.22  In
addition, two new stipulations indicate increased Communist government concerns
about civil unrest.  The first bans Internet news services from inciting illegal
assemblies, marches and demonstrations; the other prohibits activity on behalf of
illegal civil groups.23   
The complex legal infrastructure governing Internet usage in China also includes
punitive measures for those who violate the regulations.  Under the September 2005
rules, websites that distribute news without government authorization are under the
threat of closure and fines of up to 30,000 yuan (US$3,700).24  Similar penalties and
fees exist for website operators who fail to register with the government, and, in
serious cases, their network access would be terminated.
Technical Methods of Content Filtering
China censors the Internet through website blocking and key word filtering,
primarily at the router level.  Routers are devices through which packets of data are
directed until they reach their final destination.  In China, routers are programmed to
channel Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) through proxy servers, which look for
politically sensitive words such as “falun” (as in “www.faluninfo.net” of the banned
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Falun Gong spiritual movement), and send back an error message (e.g., “file not
found”) to the Internet user who requested the page.  Internet search results are
similarly blocked.  For example, although the phrase “Taiwan independence,” may
not be part of a website URL, entering this phrase into a search engine would result
in a URL followed by those words (i.e., www.google.com/search?Taiwan+
Independence), which would trigger the router to filter and block the search results.25
The OpenNet Initiative found that China tolerates occasional over-blocking as the
price of preventing access to prohibited sites.26 
Cyber-Police, Punitive Action, and Self-Censorship
For those websites that bypass automated filtering, China’s Ministry of Public
Security (MPS) reportedly employs 30,000 human monitors, or “cyber-police,” to
monitor Internet content.27  This cyber-police force, established in 2000, operates as
a division within the police departments of 700 cities and provinces in China.  Along
with investigating online crimes, such as spreading viruses, pornography, or
attempting financial fraud, the cyber-police monitor websites and e-mail content and
remove objectionable or subversive material.28 
In addition to an established Internet police force, the Chinese government
solicits help from citizens themselves to monitor Internet content.  In July 2004, the
MPS established a network of online reporting centers accompanied by a rewards
component that encourages citizens to report “illegal” or “harmful” information.29
Xinhua News Agency disclosed that by October 2004, 50 citizens were rewarded
500-2,000 yuan ($62-$247) for reporting pornography and 18 citizens were rewarded
3,000 to 10,000 yuan ($370-$1,235) for reporting illegal online gambling.  Although
Xinhua did not disclose statistics for citizens who reported “subversive” political
content, the guidelines on the cyber-police website state that citizen vigilance should
not be limited to reporting pornography, but should extend to online political
activities as well.30
As of May 2004, Reporters without Borders, an international press freedom
group, stated that 61 PRC citizens had been arrested and detained for posting
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messages or articles on the Internet that were considered subversive.31  Amnesty
International stated that some “cyber dissidents” were charged with revealing state
secrets or endangering state security and received prison sentences of two to twelve
years.32  Although the government generally does not prosecute citizens who receive
dissident e-mail publications, forwarding such messages sometimes results in
detention. Some contend that the detainment of Internet political writers reflects
Chinese repression of free media in general; at the end of 2004, 42 journalists
reportedly were imprisoned in the PRC.33  Since prohibited material like “state
secrets” have not been clearly defined by PRC authorities, many reporters, writers,
and Internet users exercise self-censorship to avoid the risk of losing their jobs or
facing criminal liability.34
U.S. Private Sector Involvement in PRC Internet
Censorship
Within the United States, there has been considerable debate surrounding the
alleged complicity of private U.S. companies in the development and maintenance
of PRC Internet filtering.  Some contend that when presented with large profit
potential, U.S. corporations are willing to overlook violations of freedom of
expression in China.  Others argue that, despite problems with censorship, U.S.
investment in China’s Internet industry will eventually lead to a more open
environment for information flows.
Analysts suggest that China’s sophisticated Internet infrastructure would not be
possible without technology and equipment imported from U.S. and other foreign
companies.  For China’s latest network upgrade, “CN2,” which began in mid-2004,
two U.S. companies, Cisco Systems and Juniper Networks, were granted four out of
six contracts.  Cisco Systems, a U.S. telecommunications equipment company, has
previously faced allegations that it assisted China in developing censorship
capabilities.35  In its recent router contract for CN2, Cisco will provide China with
its 12000 Series routers, which are equipped with filtering capability typically used
to prevent Internet attacks (i.e., worms and viruses).  This technology can also be
used by PRC authorities to block politically sensitive content.36  Derek Bambauer,
a researcher at the OpenNet Initiative, believes that without this upgrade, routers in
China are not searching deeply within packets of data for banned keywords, because
it would put an enormous load on the routers.  Some contend that Cisco routers and
the CN2 network upgrade may enable Chinese authorities to employ more
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sophisticated keyword filtering.37  Cisco denies allegations that it has altered its
products to suit the objectives of PRC cyber-policing.  Cisco has declared that it does
not tailor its products to the China market, and the products it sells in China are the
same as those to other countries.38
In addition to U.S. companies, such as Cisco, that provide hardware, a number
of U.S. software and Internet service providers, such as Yahoo, Google, and
Microsoft, have been accused of complying with censorship in China.39  In 2002,
Yahoo was heavily criticized by human rights groups for voluntarily signing a pledge
of “self-discipline,” promising to follow China’s censorship laws.   In June 2005,
Microsoft’s blog-hosting service, MSN Spaces, began removing words like
“democracy” and “human rights” from use in Chinese blog titles and postings.40
Google also prevents Chinese Internet users from accessing sites that Chinese
authorities deem politically sensitive.  When asked about their role in Chinese
censorship, most companies maintain that they must follow the laws of the host
country in which they are doing business.41  
Yahoo and Shi Tao Case.  Yahoo has come under fire for giving the
personal e-mail address of a Chinese journalist, Shi Tao, to PRC government
authorities, which led to his criminal conviction and sentence of 10 years in prison.
In April 2004, Shi, who was an editor at Contemporary Business News based in
Hunan province, attended an editorial meeting in which government officials read an
internal document outlining media restrictions before the 15th anniversary of the
1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown in June 2004.  Shi sent copies of his notes via
his personal Yahoo e-mail account to a pro-democracy organization in the United
States.  PRC state security authorities later requested information from Yahoo that
enabled them to identify Shi and use it in his conviction.  Jerry Yang, co-founder and
senior executive of Yahoo, confirmed that his company gave Chinese authorities
information and described the company’s ultimate compliance as part of the legal
burden of doing business in China.42  Human rights groups and others contend,
however, that Yahoo and other U.S. companies seem too willing to accommodate the
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U.S. Government Efforts to Promote Unrestricted
Internet Access in China
Administration Views and Reactions 
In the past, cabinet-level U.S. officials have expressed their belief that growth
of the Internet and other information technologies will bring about wide-scale
democratization abroad.44  Since the 1990’s U.S. policy has emphasized a belief that
increased contact through trade will encourage greater exchanges of information and
create the conditions for significant political and cultural change.  This view is
reflected in a speech President Bush delivered on November 16, 2005 in Kyoto,
Japan:
Economic liberalization in Taiwan helped fuel its desire for individual political
freedom — because men and women who are allowed to control their own
wealth will eventually insist on controlling their own lives and their future... As
China [PRC] reforms its economy, its leaders are finding that once the door to
freedom is opened even a crack, it cannot be closed.  As the people of China
grow in prosperity, their demands for political freedom will grow as well.45
The Bush Administration has made efforts to bring human rights concerns to the
table.  In September 2005, President Bush presented a list of political prisoners that
the U.S. government believes to be wrongly persecuted by the PRC.  When President
Bush visited China in November 2005, however, none of the journalists, business
leaders, or political dissidents mentioned had been released.46  U.S. Secretary of
Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has also made statements on the importance of political
freedoms in China:  “Every society has to be vigilant against another type of Great
Wall ... a wall that limits speech, information, and choices.”47  The State Department
has censured the Chinese government by including an explanation of the PRC’s
media and Internet controls and related persecution of political dissidents in its
annual human rights report.  However, aside from diplomatic rebukes of China’s
restrictions on freedom expression, U.S. actions to combat Internet censorship in
China have primarily been in the form of Congressional funding for anti-censorship
software.
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Congressional Action
In early 2003 Christopher Cox introduced The Global Internet Freedom Act
(H.R. 48, 108th Congress), a bill to develop and implement a global strategy to
combat state-sponsored Internet jamming and persecution of those who use the
Internet.  Though it was not passed on its own, the provisions of the Global Internet
Freedom Act were subsumed into H.R. 1950, the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act of 2004-2005, which was passed by the House in July 2003.  The act would have
authorized $8,000,000 for FY2004 and FY2005 to the Broadcasting Board of
Governors for the establishment of the “Office of Global Internet Freedom.”  In the
109th Congress, Representative Cox reintroduced the Global Internet Freedom Act
as H.R. 2216 in May 2005.  At the time of this report, November 2005, the bill has
been referred to the U.S. House Committee on International Relations.
International Broadcasting Bureau.48  The U.S. Broadcasting Board of
Governors (BBG), which oversees the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), has
promoted Internet freedom in China by focusing on its Voice of America (VOA) and
Radio Free Asia (RFA) websites, which are regularly blocked by Chinese authorities.
In 2001, the BBG provided $100,000 to Safeweb Inc., a government contracted
company that had also been briefly funded by the CIA, to provide proxy servers to
help Chinese Internet users access prohibited information.49  However, within a year,
Safeweb’s technology was reportedly unsuccessful in protecting user identities.50
Since 2003, the IBB has primarily funded Dynamic Internet Technology
(DynaWeb) and UltraReach, which have each developed software to enable Chinese
Internet users to access VOA and RFA websites (see table).  DynaWeb’s website is
difficult to block because of  “anonymizing” technology that regularly changes its
numerical Internet Protocol (IP) address.  Dynaweb president, Bill Xia, disclosed that
earlier efforts to provide Chinese Internet users with unblocked IP addresses through
an e-mail subscription service had failed because censors had also subscribed to the
service, and quickly blocked those sites as well.51  According to Xia, DynaWeb must
evolve according to how China censors the Internet, and that “both parties can always
implement new technologies to stay ahead and sustain the advantage.”  However, in
testimony before the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Xia stated that
censors have a “brighter future,” because China purchases the most advanced
censorship technology from Western companies and has more resources than
counter-censorship efforts in the United States.52
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Table 1.  International Broadcasting Bureau Funding for
Counter-Censorship Technology
FY2003 FY2004 FY2005
Dynaweb $497,700 $806,326 $685,000
UltraReach $3,000 $21,000 $42,003
Total $500,700 $827,326 $727,003
Source:  Broadcasting Board of Governors.
As of April 2005, Dynamic’s homepage was viewed about 90,000 times per day,
while UltraReach allows approximately 4,000 visits and 30,000 page views for VOA
and 2,600 visits and 28,000 page views for RFA daily.53  Visits to these sites
reportedly rise when PRC censorship tightens, such as during the SARS outbreak of
2003.  The BBG disseminates Chinese-language news summaries, some of which
contain critical opinions or stories about China, to recipients in China via e-mail.
These e-mails employ techniques that circumvent censorship and include IP
addresses of proxy servers through which users may view VOA and RFA reports.54
Issues for U.S. Policy
There is considerable debate on whether U.S. support of censor-circumventing
software is effective.  Some experts believe that if freedom of expression in China
is the goal, counter-censorship technology alone will not be enough.  U.S. companies
face no legal and little political pressure to avoid supplying foreign governments with
advanced technology or services that may be used to suppress freedom of expression.
Moreover, some experts believe that there needs to be more demand from Chinese
people themselves to obtain uncensored information.55  They posit that if demand for
free information is great enough from within China, the government will be more
inclined to loosen its grip on Internet information controls.56  When the popular
search engine, Google, was blocked in 2002, some scholars believe that the Chinese
government gave into pressure and lifted the block after only 10 days because of the
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Another view is that the U.S. development of counter-censorship software and
strategies for Chinese Internet users is effective and  requires additional funding from
the U.S. government.58  In addition to greater political openness and freedom of
expression for Chinese people, many assert that uncensored information in China will
have significant international impact.  In the face of pandemic health threats, like a
potential outbreak of Avian Flu, many U.S. policymakers may find it imperative to
continue to support freedom of expression and open media in China.  Whether
counter-censorship is most effective at the technological level, however, is at
question.  In addition to developing software to fight Internet censorship, some
suggest that diplomatic pressure and increased dialogue can be used to encourage
greater openness and freedom on the Internet and in the media.  According to the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “the President and the Congress
should urge the Chinese government to eliminate prior restraints on publishing, cease
detaining journalists and writers, stop blocking foreign news broadcasts and websites,
and specify precisely what kind of political content is illegal to publish.”59
Additionally, some suggest that encouraging or requiring a code of conduct for U.S.
companies doing business in foreign countries may help guide business practices
when human rights issues are concerned.  Frank discussion between U.S. and PRC
leaders on freedom of expression and China’s definition of “sensitive” information
and “state secret”  may also be another U.S. option, one that may be more effective
than using software technology to try to directly subvert China’s blocking of RFA
and VOA websites.
